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Abstract: We analyze a two-country model of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI). Two firms, each of which is originally situated in only one of the two
countries, first decide whether to build a plant in the foreign country. Then, they
decide whether to relocate R&D activities. Finally, they engage in product-market
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Our main points are: first, FDI liberalization causes a relocation of R&D activi-
ties if intrafirm communication is suﬃciently well developed, external spillovers are
substantial, competition is not too strong and foreign markets are not too small.
Second, such a relocation of R&D activities will usually nevertheless increase do-
mestic welfare since it only occurs if intrafirm communication is well developed
and therefore knowledge generated and obtained abroad flows back to the domes-
tic country. Third, the potential of R&D oﬀshoring makes FDI itself more likely.
Fourth, when countries are asymmetric, the small-country firm is more likely to
oﬀshore its R&D activities into the large country than conversely.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a framework for analyzing the determinants of multi-
national firms’ choices of locations for production and R&D simultaneously.
Our analysis is motivated by a set of stylized facts on the R&D activities of
multinational firms:
Stylized Fact 1 Most of the private-sector R&D is done by multinational
firms.
According to theWorld Investment Report (UNCTAD 2005), global busi-
ness R&D expenditure in 2002 amounts to $450 billion, of which at least two
thirds are carried out by multinationals. Having thus established the im-
portance of multinational R&D activities, we turn to facts concerning the
location of these activities.
Stylized Fact 2 R&D activities are highly concentrated geographically.
In 2002, more than four fifths of global R&D were concentrated in ten
countries (UNCTAD 2005). While this statement refers to all R&D activities,
it applies in much the same way to those R&D activities that are carried out
oﬀshore by multinational firms, that is, in countries where the headquarter
is not located.
Stylized Fact 3 The R&D activities of foreign aﬃliates of multinational
firms are highly concentrated geographically.
For instance, in a survey of the world’s largest R&D spenders reported
in UNCTAD (2005), the largest number of firms (58.8%) name the United
States as a location of foreign R&D. The next in line are: United King-
dom (47.1%), China (35.5%), France (35.3%), Japan (29.4%), India (25%),
Canada (19.1%), Germany (19.1%).
Importantly, R&D oﬀshoring is gaining pace.
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Stylized Fact 4 Multinationals increasingly move their R&D oﬀshore, that
is, away from the headquarter locations.
The global R&D expenditure of foreign aﬃliates amounted to $30 billion
in 1993 and $67 billion in 2002 (UNCTAD 2005). Thus while the share of
foreign aﬃliates in total business R&D is still not very high, it is increasing
rapidly.1 This mirrors a broader pattern concerning international service
outsourcing. While the share of business services produced abroad is still
very low, it has grown substantially recently (Amiti and Wei 2004).
There is also some agreement about the kinds of location where the R&D
activities of multinational firms concentrate (Belderbos et al. 2005).
Stylized Fact 5 R&D by foreign aﬃliates is attracted particularly
(i) to large markets and markets with high per capita income;
(ii) to locations where the firms already have manufacturing and sales activ-
ities;
(iii) to countries with large technological know-how.
This statement summarizes a large empirical literature.2 Several observa-
tions illustrate the role of market size and per-capita income (i). First, many
multinationals moved their R&D activities to Europe in the late nineteen
eighties when the possibility of the single large European market became
evident (Caves 1997). Second, similarly, as developing countries such as
China and India have recently grown rapidly, so has their share of foreign
aﬃliate R&D (UNCTAD 2005). Third, some smaller countries like Sweden
have experienced a more dramatic outflow of R&D activities when their firms
engaged in FDI (Caves 1997).
Part (ii) of the statement reflects what used to be the main motive for
aﬃliate R&D, namely the need to adapt products to local demand. Even
1The internationalization of R&D has also been documented elsewhere (Caves 1996, ch.
7, Florida 1997, Belderbos 2001, 2003, Kuemmerle 1999, von Zedtwidtz and Gassmann
2002).
2See, for example, Zejan (1990), Belderbos (2001, 2003).
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when the knowledge generated by oﬀshore R&D is used globally, however,
this activity is likely to be complementary to horizontal FDI, as research and
development activities quite clearly benefit from close spatial interactions
with the production process.
Part (iii) of the statement reflects the fact that firms are increasingly using
knowledge generated in their international subsidiaries as an input to home-
country production. Thus, foreign R&D is often accompanied by technology
sourcing, or reverse technology transfer, as Blomström and Kokko (1996) put
it: The multinationals benefit from R&D spillovers from local firms which
they then use to improve their knowledge base at home.3 It is often argued
that technology sourcing played a role for the location decisions of Japanese
firms in the U.S. (Kogut and Chang 1991). More generally, the importance
of technology sourcing has been documented in many empirical papers.4
The growing empirical importance of the phenomenon of R&D oﬀshoring
notwithstanding, there is little theoretical analysis of R&D location decisions
and, specifically, of technology sourcing. Natural questions are:
1. Under which circumstances do R&D relocation and technology sourcing
arise?
2. What are typical characteristics of R&D host countries?
3. How are multinational firms’ choices of production locations influenced
by considerations concerning R&D locations?
4. What are the welfare eﬀects of R&D oﬀshoring?
3Earlier literature deals with technology transfer through multinational corporations
to host countries and with the possible eﬀects on these countries (e.g. Findlay 1978,
Mansfield and Romeo 1980, Das 1987, Blomström and Kokko 1996).
4Relevant studies include: Cantwell and Hodson (1991), Håkanson and Nobel (1993),
Neven and Siotis (1993), OECD (1994), Baily and Gersbach (1995), Fors and Zejan (1996);
Almeida (1996), Florida (1997), Kuemmerle (1997), Branstetter (2000) and Frost (2001),
Griﬃth et al. (2003).
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In this paper, we analyze these issues in a simple strategic model of loca-
tional choice and R&D decisions of multinationals that emphasizes internal
and external knowledge flows in multinational firms. The model is designed
to capture the above stylized facts, in particular, 3-5. Specifically, there are
two countries and two firms, each of which is originally situated in only one
of the two countries. In Stage 1, firms decide whether to build a plant in
the foreign country. In Stage 2, they decide whether to relocate R&D ac-
tivities and, finally, they engage in product-market competition. There are
R&D complementarities: If firms carry out R&D in the same location, the
resulting cost reduction is greater than if each firm innovates in an isolated
location. Further, there are imperfect internal knowledge flows. The results
of innovation in one location can be applied elsewhere, but imperfections in
communication mean that the resulting cost reduction is smaller.
In our setting, therefore, FDI has a dual role: It allows market access and
technology sourcing. However, spillovers are only acquired if firms go beyond
the mere imitation of host countries. Firms move to R&D centers where they
have to build up absorptive capacity of their own to benefit from spillovers.5
The knowledge obtained in these “R&D centers” is transferred to the home
countries, where it reduces costs and thus increases profits. For instance, in
the financial service industry London has emerged as the dominant research
center in Europe. Similarly, in the computer industry, many foreign firms
have moved parts of their R&D activities to Silicon Valley, where many of
their North-American competitors are also present.
Our model generates the following answers to the four questions posed
above: First, FDI liberalization may induce a relocation of R&D activities
when intrafirm communication is suﬃciently strong, product-market com-
petition is suﬃciently weak and external spillovers are suﬃciently strong.
However, there are potential non-monotone eﬀects of improving intrafirm
communication and decreasing relocation costs on the extent of FDI. Sec-
5For the notion of absorptive capacity, see Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Leahy and Neary
1997, von Graevenitz 2004.
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ond, though there are also conceivable countereﬀects, large markets are par-
ticularly attractive as R&D hosts because the knowledge generated in the
subsidiaries can then also be used to improve competitiveness in those mar-
kets. Third, compared to a setting without the possibility of R&D relocation,
FDI becomes more attractive. Fourth, such a relocation of R&D activities
will usually increase domestic welfare since it only occurs if intrafirm commu-
nication is well developed and therefore knowledge generated and obtained
abroad flows back to the domestic country.
Unlike much of the existing literature on foreign direct investment, we
consider only non-tradeable goods. Two reasons justify this. First, our ap-
proach generalizes to tradeable goods in a straightforward fashion as long
as trade costs are suﬃciently high. Second, the service sector and the non-
tradeable manufacturing sector comprise about two thirds of the economy
in industrialized countries, and both FDI and R&D are becoming increas-
ingly important in these industries, in particular in the service sector (Neven
and Siotis 1993, Hackman 1997). For example, for service industries such
as banking and finance, general merchandising and telecommunications, to
name only a few, FDI is the only feasible form of globalization, so that firms
do not face the decision between exporting and becoming multinational that
has been highlighted elsewhere. Given the growing importance of R&D in
the service sector, our question about the location of R&D in the process of
FDI is relevant and complements the work on the decision between exports
and FDI.
The strategic analysis of R&D location decisions by multinationals has
been examined by other authors. Most closely related is Belderbos et al.
(2005) who also provide a theory of R&D locations. Several other studies
discuss FDI decisions in their relation to innovation and spillovers, with-
out discussing R&D locations. Examples include Siotis (1999), Petit and
Sanna-Randaccio (2000), Bjorvatn and Eckel (2001), Norback (2001), and
Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2002). We discuss the relation between
these papers and our approach more carefully in an extra section.
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We proceed as follows. In section 2, we lay out the structure of the model.
In Section 3, we analyze the equilibrium structure of the R&D location game.
The central Section 4 shows which subgame perfect equilibria can arise for
the FDI game. The focus is on the factors leading to research relocation,
and on its welfare eﬀects. Section 5 discusses welfare eﬀects. In Section 6,
we discuss related literature. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Stages of the game
Consider the following three-stage game. There are two firms, k = 1, 2 and
two countries, s = 1, 2. Suppose that initially firm 1 has a plant in country
1, and firm 2 has a plant in country 2. The firms’ actions can be summarized
as follows.
Stage 1: Firms decide whether to carry out FDI (lk = I) or not (lk = N).
Stage 2: Firms choose R&D locations, rk (k = 1, 2) .
Stage 3: Product market competition takes place.
In Stage 1, each firm decides whether to become multinational, that is,
whether to build an additional plant in the country where it has no produc-
tion facilities, at a fixed cost of F > 0 which could include the actual costs
of building a plant as well as the costs of market access, such as advertising
outlays.
In Stage 2, firms decide whether to continue to carry out their R&D
activities (or “innovate”) at home (rk = H) or whether to relocate them
to the other country (rk = A). We assume, however, that such relocation
(or oﬀshoring) is only possible if the firm has carried out FDI.6 Relocation
involves fixed costs R > 0. We assume that the impact of R&D decisions on
the marginal production costs in a particular location depends on production
and R&D choices in a manner that reflects the extent to which external and
6This is consistent with item (ii) in Stylized Fact 5.
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internal knowledge flows take place.
If both firms k carry out their R&D in diﬀerent countries there are no
external spillovers by assumption. Each firm achieves a cost reduction of
∆ (∆ > 0) for the goods produced in the country s where R&D is carried out,
which is to be interpreted as being exclusively the fruit of its own research.
If the firms locate R&D in the same country, there are interfirm (exter-
nal) spillovers within each country. Some of the knowledge obtained in the
process of innovation by one firm will be disseminated to the other firm in the
same country. This assumption is plausible if foreign direct investment takes
place close to the R&D locations of domestic firms, so that locational knowl-
edge spillovers as discussed by Marshall (1920) are likely. The assumption
that external spillovers only arise in locations where both firms have R&D
activities is consistent with the notion that firms require absorptive capacity
to benefit from spillovers (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Leahy and Neary 1997,
von Graevenitz 2004). To capture the external spillovers, we assume that, in
a country where both firms are present and carry out R&D, firms obtain a
cost reduction of (1 + ε)∆, where ε > 0. The parameter ε can be interpreted
as a measure of R&D complementarities.
Next, we capture the idea that intrafirm knowledge transfer plays an
important role in multiplant firms because it helps to avoid duplication in
research eﬀorts. This has long been recognized as a reason for the emergence
of multinational firms (Dunning 1981, Caves 1996).7 We assume that a frac-
tion γ ∈ [0, 1] of any cost reduction that a firm achieves at one location,
gets carried over to the other plant of the firm. The polar cases γ = 0 and
γ = 1 correspond to no internal communication and perfect internal commu-
nication, respectively. There are many reasons why intrafirm communication
might not be perfect, that is, why γ < 1 is possible.8 Obviously, there could
be costs of communication between diﬀerent plants and costs of intrafirm
labor mobility. There might also be incentive problems: if managers of dif-
7See Baily and Gersbach 1995 for some evidence.
8Gersbach and Schmutzler (1999) and Belderbos et al. (2005) also allow for this pos-
sibility.
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ferent plants are rewarded according to relative performance schemes, they
may not be willing to release all relevant information.
In Stage 3, both firms take production decisions. Markets are segregated,
that is, we consider only non-tradeable goods or services. Total local demand
in country s is a decreasing function Ds (ps) of the price ps. Suppose firm
k’s marginal costs in country s are constant and given as cks = h− δks ·∆,
where h denotes marginal costs if no cost reduction takes place and δks is an
indicator function that captures the country s under consideration and the
R&D locations of both firms. Specifically, δks can take four values:
• δks = 1 in countries s where only firm k innovates
• δks = 1 + ε in countries s where both firms innovate
• δks = γ (1 + ε) in countries s such that both firms innovate in s0 6= s
• δks = γ in countries s such that only firm k innovates in s0 6= s
We assume that h ≥ (1 + ε)∆ such that marginal costs cannot become
negative.
If firm k is the only producer in location s,9 it obtains the monopoly
profit corresponding to cks, or equivalently δks, which we write as ΠM (δks).
If two firms are at the same location, they engage in duopolistic competition.
We do not yet specify the nature of competition. However, we assume that
a unique Nash equilibrium of the game exists for arbitrary marginal costs
cks (k = 1, 2; s = 1, 2). We denote the resulting profits of firm k in country
s, if firm j 6= k has marginal costs cjs = h − δjs∆, as ΠD (δks, δjs). For
convenience, we write ΠD (δks) ≡ ΠD (δks, δjs) if δks = δjs. Depending on
the locations of production and R&D, possible product market profits in one
location are therefore
ΠM (1) ,ΠM (γ (1 + ε)) ,ΠD (1 + ε) ,ΠD (γ (1 + ε)) ,ΠD (1, γ) ,ΠD (γ, 1) .
9Note that this case can only occur for k = s.
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Assuming that the unique equilibrium will be played in the product mar-
ket stage, the game can be reduced to the first two stages, that is, to the
choice of production locations and innovation locations. The following as-
sumption gives very weak conditions on the nature of oligopolistic interaction.
Assumption 1 (a) ΠD (δks, δjs) is non-decreasing in δks and non-increasing
in δjs for k = 1, 2 and j 6= k.
(b) ΠD (γ (1 + ε)) < ΠD (1 + ε).
Part (a) is satisfied in virtually all conceivable oligopoly models; part (b)
is clearly satisfied whenever the positive eﬀect of lower own costs on profits
dominates over the negative eﬀect of lower competitor costs. This requires
very reasonable assumptions on demand elasticities (Shapiro 1989).
3 Analyzing the R&D subgames
3.1 The general model
We can treat the model as a two-stage game with decisions on FDI preced-
ing decisions on R&D locations. There are four second-stage games, (I, I),
(I,N), (N, I), (N,N), the last of which is degenerate as it does not involve
any R&D decisions.
The subgames (I,N) and (N, I): These subgames are analogous; only
the firm that has carried out FDI takes an R&D decision. If this firm oﬀshores
R&D, it obtains payoﬀs ΠM (γ (1 + ε))+ΠD (1 + ε)−F−R; if not, its payoﬀs
are ΠM (1)+ΠD (γ, 1)−F . The following simple result immediately follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose lk = I for only one firm. Then there is an equilib-
rium where this firm chooses oﬀshoring (rk = A) if and only if
ΠM (γ (1 + ε)) +ΠD (1 + ε) ≥ ΠM (1) +ΠD (γ, 1) +R. (1)
Clearly, high R&D complementarities (ε) and low relocation costs (R)
favor oﬀshoring. Interestingly, however, at this level of generality, the eﬀects
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r2= H r2= A
r1= H ΠD (1, γ) + ΠD (γ, 1)− F ΠD (1 + ε)+ΠD (γ (1 + ε))−F − R
ΠD (1, γ)+ΠD (γ, 1)−F ΠD (1 + ε) +ΠD (γ (1 + ε))−F
r1= A ΠD (γ (1 + ε))+ΠD (1 + ε)− F ΠD (1, γ)+ΠD (γ, 1)−F − R
ΠD (γ (1 + ε)) +ΠD (1 + ε)− F − R ΠD (1, γ)+ΠD (γ, 1)−F − R
Table 1: Subgame I,I
of improved intrafirm communication on R&D are still somewhat ambiguous,
as both sides of (1) are increasing in γ. Intuitively, as communication im-
proves, knowledge generated in the oﬀshore R&D center is more valuable in
increasing monopoly profits at home; at the same time, however, knowledge
generated at home also is more useful in increasing profits abroad. However,
the first eﬀect would appear to dominate; at least the Cournot example in
Section 5 confirms that oﬀshoring becomes more likely as communication
improves.
The subgame (I, I): Payoﬀs are given by Table 1.
Depending on parameters, the subgame equilibria can therefore be char-
acterized as follows.
Proposition 2 (i) Suppose
ΠD (γ (1 + ε)) +ΠD (1 + ε) ≥ ΠD (1, γ) +ΠD (γ, 1) +R (2)
Then there are two pure-strategy equilibria, (A,H) and (H,A). Thus, the
equilibria involve oﬀshoring.
(ii) Suppose condition (2) does not hold.
(a) Suppose
ΠD (γ (1 + ε)) +ΠD (1 + ε) ≤ ΠD (γ, 1) +ΠD (1, γ)−R (3)
Then, there are two pure-strategy equilibria, (A,A) and (H,H).
(b) If condition (3) does not hold, the equilibrium (H,H) is unique.
First, consider condition (2) which guarantees the existence of oﬀshoring
equilibria. This condition clearly requires that R&D complementarities are
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suﬃciently large relative to relocation costs, so that one firm is willing to
bear the cost of oﬀshoring in order to benefit from spillovers. Clearly, there
is a “chicken” structure in the relocation game, with each firm preferring the
other one to move: While product market profits are the same for both firms,
the firm that carries out R&D oﬀshore has to bear the relocation costs.
Second, note that the oﬀshoring equilibrium requires that competition
is not too intense; otherwise firms would prefer diﬀerentiating each other in
terms of R&D locations so as to soften competition.10 Conversely, if condition
(2) does not hold, firms prefer diﬀerentiation of R&D locations. Obviously,
the most eﬃcient way of achieving this is if neither firm relocates, which hap-
pens in the equilibrium (H,H). However, for low relocation costs, there is
another equilibrium (A,A). Condition (3) makes sure this equilibrium exists,
even though it is Pareto dominated. For simplicity, we ignore the implausi-
ble equilibrium (A,A) in the following, so that the equilibrium structure in
subgame (I, I) is fully determined by whether (2) holds.
Third, the eﬀects of improving communication are again somewhat am-
biguous: As γ increases, so does ΠD (γ (1 + ε)). Intuitively, improving com-
munication increases home profits for a firm that oﬀshores. On the other
hand, ΠD (γ, 1) + ΠD (1, γ), the total duopoly profits of a firm that does
not oﬀshore, could increase too. Even though a firm that does not oﬀshore
faces tougher competition at home from the competitor that uses knowledge
generated abroad (ΠD (1, γ) decreases as γ increases), it can similarly com-
pete more eﬀectively abroad, using knowledge generated at home (ΠD (γ, 1)
increases). Again, our numerical example will suggest that nevertheless im-
provements in communication tend to induce oﬀshoring.
We summarize our findings as follows.
Corollary 1 : (i) In each subgame of the R&D game, oﬀshoring is more
likely if R&D complementarities are strong and relocation costs are low.
(ii) When both firms have carried out FDI, oﬀshoring is more likely when
10As an extreme case, under homogeneous Bertrand competition, the left-hand side of
(2) is always zero, so that the condition cannot hold.
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competition is weak.
(iii) The eﬀect of improved intrafirm communication on oﬀshoring is am-
biguous.
4 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
We now analyze the subgame-perfect equilibria of the two-stage game. The
main goal of this section is to understand under which conditions research
relocation takes place along with FDI. The preceding analysis suggests that
we should distinguish between diﬀerent parameter regions, according to the
outcome of the R&D game. If (1) and (2) both hold, there will be oﬀshoring
no matter whether one or two firms have carried out FDI; we denote this
parameter regime as LRC (“low relocation costs”). If (1) and (2) are both
violated, there will be no oﬀshoring in either type of subgame; we shall call
the regime HRC (“high relocation costs”).
In the numerical example below, it will turn out that (1) typically holds
whenever (2) does. We shall thus refer to the case where (1) holds, but (2)
does not as MRC (“medium relocation costs”) and ignore the case that (2)
holds, but (1) does not. In MRC, oﬀshoring only takes place if one firm
has carried out FDI. We thereby ignore the theoretical possibility that R&D
oﬀshoring takes place in subgame (I, I), but not in the subgames (I,N)
and (N, I), as this possibility does not arise for our parametrizations of the
Cournot game.
4.1 The LRC-Regime
In regime LRC, characterized by conditions (1) and (2), relocation costs are
so low that R&D oﬀshoring takes place in any subgame that involves FDI.
This limits the candidates for equilibria as follows:
1. No FDI: (N,N)
2. Asymmetric FDI with R&D oﬀshoring: ((I,A);N)
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3. Symmetric FDI with R&D oﬀshoring: ((I,H) ; (I;A))
The following proposition describes the equilibrium structure in regime
LRC.
Proposition 3 In regime LRC:
(i) The No-FDI Equilibrium exists if and only if:
ΠM (1) ≥ ΠM (γ (1 + ε)) +ΠD (1 + ε)− F −R (4)
(ii) The Asymmetric FDI Equilibrium (with oﬀshoring) exists if and only if
the following two conditions hold simultaneously:
ΠD (γ (1 + ε))− F −R ≤ 0 (5)
ΠM (1) ≤ ΠM (γ (1 + ε)) +ΠD (1 + ε)− F −R (6)
(iii) The Symmetric FDI Equilibrium (with oﬀshoring) exists if and only if:
ΠD (γ (1 + ε))− F −R ≥ 0. (7)
The LRC condition not only guarantees that oﬀshoring must take place
along the equilibrium path for any equilibrium with FDI; in addition, it must
also occur for each first-period deviation from any equilibrium, with or with-
out FDI. Therefore, condition (4) guarantees that the no-FDI equilibrium
profit is higher than the profit in the deviation subgame, which involves oﬀ-
shoring. As to the Asymmetric FDI Equilibrium, by condition (5), the firm
which does not carry out FDI does not want to deviate and invest, assuming
that it would relocate itself in case it deviated to the game (I,I).11(6) is the
best-response condition for the investor. For the Symmetric FDI Equilib-
rium, (7) makes sure both firms want to invest, bearing in mind that the
competitor would relocate in the equilibrium of the deviation game.12
11Clearly, the assumption that the firm would relocate itself in the case of deviation
makes deviation less attractive than the alternative assumption that the competitor bears
the burden of relocation, in which case condition (5) becomes ΠD (γ (1 + ε))− F ≤ 0.
12This condition guarantees that even the firm that bears the burden of relocation prefers
this to deviation.
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4.2 The MRC Regime
In the MRC regime with intermediate relocation costs, oﬀshoring takes place
in the subgames (I,N) and(N, I), but not in the subgame (I, I). This reduces
the equilibrium candidates as follows.
1. No FDI: (N,N);
2. Asymmetric FDI with R&D oﬀshoring: ((I, A);N);
3. Symmetric FDI without R&D oﬀshoring ((I,H); (I;H)).
The following proposition describes the equilibrium structure in regime
MRC.
Proposition 4 In regime MRC:
(i) A No-FDI equilibrium (N,N) exists if and only if
ΠM (1) ≥ ΠM (γ (1 + ε)) +ΠD (1 + ε)− F −R. (8)
(ii) An Asymmetric FDI Equilibrium ((I,A) ;N) exists if and only if the
following conditions hold simultaneously:
ΠD (1 + ε) ≥ ΠD (1, γ) +ΠD (γ, 1)− F (9)
ΠD (1 + ε) +ΠM (γ (1 + ε))− F −R ≥ ΠM (1) . (10)
(iii) A Symmetric FDI equilibrium ((I,H) ; (I,H)) exists if and only if
ΠD (1, γ) +ΠD (γ, 1)− F ≥ ΠD (1 + ε) . (11)
Again, the MRC condition not only restricts the behavior along the equi-
librium path, but also for every deviation subgame. Intuitively, condition
(8) makes sure that the profits in the No-FDI case are higher than under
deviation to FDI, bearing in mind that the firm would relocate following
such a deviation. Now consider the Asymmetric FDI Equilibrium. Condi-
tion (9) makes sure the non-investor does not want to invest in Stage 1; (10)
guarantees that the investing firm does not want to deviate by not investing.
Condition (11) is the symmetric first-stage no-deviation condition, bearing in
mind that, following deviation, the firm that does not deviate would relocate.
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4.3 The HRC Regime
In the HRC regime, R&D oﬀshoring does not take place in any subgame.
This reduces the equilibrium candidates as follows.
1. No FDI: (N,N);
2. Asymmetric FDI without R&D oﬀshoring: ((I,H);N);
3. Symmetric FDI without R&D oﬀshoring ((I,H); (I;H)).
The following proposition describes the equilibrium structure in regime
HRC.
Proposition 5 In regime HRC:
(i) A No-FDI equilibrium (N,N) exists if and only if
0 ≥ ΠD (γ, 1)− F . (12)
(ii) An Asymmetric-FDI Equilibrium (I,H;N) exists only if
0 = ΠD (γ, 1)− F . (13)
(iii) A Symmetric FDI equilibrium (I,H; I,H) exists if and only if
ΠD (γ, 1)− F ≥ 0. (14)
Intuitively, as there can be no R&D oﬀshoring on the equilibrium path or
in any deviation subgame, firms will earn ΠD (γ, 1)− F in an FDI location.
Thus, carrying out FDI is worthwhile if and only if ΠD (γ, 1) > F .
4.4 Comparative Statics
Propositions 3, 4 and 5 have simple comparative statics implications.
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Corollary 2 : Parameter changes that do not aﬀect the R&D regime have
the following eﬀects on FDI.
(1) An equilibrium without FDI becomes less likely as fixed costs F or reloca-
tion costs R fall, R&D complementarities ε increase or internal communica-
tion γ improves.
(2) A symmetric FDI equilibrium where both firms carry out FDI becomes
more likely if fixed costs F and relocation costs R fall.
Note that the eﬀects of the remaining parameters on the chances of ob-
taining a symmetric FDI equilibrium are ambiguous. For instance, in regime
LRC such an equilibrium, which would involve oﬀshoring, becomes more
likely as R&D complementarities increase. In regime MRC, there would be
no oﬀshoring in the proposed symmetric FDI equilibrium, but oﬀshoring
would arise in case of a deviation to a situation where only one firm invests.
Thus, high R&D complementarities ε make a symmetric FDI less likely in
regime MRC.
An important limitation of these comparative-statics results is that they
are stated for fixed R&D regimes. As we saw in Section 3, the R&D regime
itself depends on parameters, so that Corollary 2 gives an incomplete picture
of the eﬀects of parameters on FDI. Clearly, however, by combining Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 with Propositions 3, 4 and 5, it is straightforward to describe
the full equilibrium structure of the game in terms of fundamentals. Writing
up the conditions in the general form is, however, somewhat cumbersome, so
that we shall focus on a numerical analysis instead.
5 The Cournot Example
We consider a simple Cournot example, with linear demand function D(p) =
a− p. Defining α ≡ a− h, we can use the standard formulas (for k 6= j):
ΠM (δks) =
(α+ δks∆)
2
4
; ΠD (δks, δjs) =
(α+ 2δks∆− δjs∆)2
9
to calculate the various equilibrium profits.
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Figure 1: The R&D Game
5.1 The R&D Game
We use a special parametrization, (ε = 1, α = 1, ∆ = 1) to delineate the
parameter regions for the relocation game in (R; γ)-space. In Figure 1, the
right line corresponds to
ΠM (γ (1 + ε)) +ΠD (1 + ε) = ΠM (1) +ΠD (γ, 1) +R (15)
for these parameter values, that is, to the boundary of the region given by
(1). Similarly, the left line corresponds to
ΠD (γ (1 + ε)) +ΠD (1 + ε) = ΠD (1, γ) +ΠD (γ, 1) +R, (16)
that is, to the boundary of the region given by (2).
Thus, to the left of the two lines, regime LRC obtains, that is, for suf-
ficiently low values of R, oﬀshoring takes place in the subgames (I,N) and
(N, I) as well as in the subgame (I, I). For suﬃciently high values, to the
right of the two lines, there is no oﬀshoring in any of these subgames (regime
HRC). In the middle, oﬀshoring only takes place for the subgames (I,N)
and (N, I), but not for (I, I) (regime MRC). In a similar vein, improved
communication tends to make relocation more likely.
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Figure 2: The FDI Game (LRC)
5.2 FDI equilibria for fixed R&D-regime
We first apply Propositions 3, 4 and 5 directly to describe the FDI equilibrium
structure for each of the regimes LRC, MRC and HRC.
5.2.1 LRC
The simplest way to present the LRC case is to confine attention to the
boundary case R = 0. Figure 2 describes the equilibrium structure for this
case in (F ; γ)-space, using our standard parametrization α = 1, ε = 1,∆ = 1.
Clearly, we are in regime LRC, no matter which value γ takes. Therefore,
we can apply Proposition 3. To the left of the left line, the only equilibrium
has both firms investing, and one country emerging as the research center.
As fixed costs increase (or the communication parameter γ falls), only one
firm carries out FDI and relocates its R&D activities. For still higher fixed
costs (and lower γ), the only equilibrium has no FDI.
5.2.2 MRC
To analyze FDI in regime MRC, we first choose a value of R for which all
three R&D regimes obtain for suitable levels of γ. Specifically, we choose
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R = 1. Then MRC obtains for γ ∈ [0.570, 0.877]. Thus, we can restrict
attention to the area between the parallel lines in Figure 3.
In this area, there is no FDI in the region to the right of the upward-
sloping line. To the left of the line, the Asymmetric FDI Equilibrium arises.
The Symmetric FDI Equilibrium does not occur for these parameters lines.
Intuitively, the high value of the R&D-complementarity parameter (ε = 1)
makes an equilibrium with FDI but without relocation unlikely.
5.2.3 HRC
For suﬃciently high values of relocation costs, relocation HRC will obtain.
Then, given the remaining parameters of the Cournot example, we are in
regime HRC for arbitrary values of γ (See Figure 1). Figure 4 shows that for
well-developed intrafirm communication and low fixed cost FDI takes place.
5.3 FDI equilibria for variable R&D-regime
We now combine the analysis of the last two subsections, describing how the
FDI-equilibrium depends on parameters when we take into account that the
R&D regime is potentially aﬀected by parameter changes.
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Figure 5 describes the structure of FDI equilibria, depending on fixed
costs F and the internal spillover parameter γ. As above, we set parameters
ε = 1, α = 1, ∆ = 1. Relocation costs are set to R = 1, so that all
three R&D regimes arise for the given values of the other parameters. Recall
that the boundary between LRC and MRC is given by γ = 0.57 and the
boundary between MRC and HRC is given by γ = 0.877. To the right
of the upward sloping line, there is no FDI. The equilibrium structure to
the left of the line depends on the regime, however. For instance, fix F =
0.1. For low values of γ, regime HRC obtains and there is no FDI (dark
area). As γ increases, the equilibrium switches to symmetric FDI. For still
higher values, the regime MRC is reached. From there on, the equilibrium
involves asymmetric FDI with oﬀshoring (lightly shaded area). Interestingly,
therefore, improvements of internal communication have ambiguous eﬀects
on FDI once the endogeneity of R&D location is taken into account. For
high levels of fixed costs, an increase in γ can only lead from "No FDI" to
an equilibrium with asymmetric FDI. For low levels of fixed costs, however,
the FDI behavior can depend on γ in a non-monotone fashion: For very bad
internal communication, the equilibrium is "No FDI". As communication
improves, there is a symmetric FDI equilibrium. As communication improves
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even more and the R&D-regime shifts to MRC, the equilibrium shifts to
asymmetric FDI.
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The Eﬀects of Intrafirm Communication on FDI
An alternative approach to understanding the comparative statics of FDI
can be obtained from Figure 5. This shows how the equilibrium structure
depends on fixed costs and R&D relocation costs. This figure is drawn for the
same parameter values as Figure 5, except that we fixed γ = 0.9, while keep-
ing R variable. Again, the two horizontal lines describe boundaries between
R&D regimes. Note, however that the lower line (R = 1.02) now corresponds
to the boundary between LRC and MRC, whereas the upper line (R = 1.6)
is the boundary between MRC and HRC. The eﬀects of increasing reloca-
tion costs are non-monotone when fixed costs are low. For small relocation
costs, there is an equilibrium with symmetric FDI. As relocation costs in-
crease, the equilibrium changes to "Asymmetric FDI with oﬀshoring". As R
increases further, regime MRC is reached, but the equilibrium remains the
same. For suﬃciently high relocation costs, however, HRC is reached, and
the equilibrium shifts to symmetric FDI without oﬀshoring again.
22
32.521.510.50
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
R
HRC
MRC
LRC
F
1.6
1.02
The Eﬀects of Reloctaion Costs on FDI (All Regimes)
5.4 Summary
The Cournot example reveals several interesting insights. First, for given
R&D regime, improved communication unambiguously makes more FDImore
likely. Second, when the endogeneity of FDI is taken into account, improved
communication can have non-monotone eﬀects on FDI, with the equilib-
rium from “No FDI” to “Symmetric FDI” and finally to a symmetric FDI.
Third, however, improved communication always makes “No FDI” less likely.
Fourth, taking oﬀshoring into account always makes “No FDI” less likely.
Fifth, however, changes in relocation costs can have non-monotone eﬀects on
the FDI equilibrium.
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6 The Welfare Eﬀects of Foreign Direct In-
vestment
The welfare eﬀects of FDI on source countries and recipients have been the
subject of considerable debate, and they are often regarded as ambiguous
when both countries are taken into account.13 Based on our analysis, we can
obviously not give a complete discussion of this point, as we are only dealing
with FDI in non-tradeables.
First, welfare discussions of oﬀshoring typically put particular empha-
sis on employment eﬀects that we do not address. Second, we only treat
non-tradeables. Therefore, the important issue that foreign direct invest-
ment may substitute for exports does not arise. However, this allows us to
fully concentrate on the welfare eﬀects associated with knowledge transfers:
we add a subtle aspect to the discussion of the welfare eﬀects of R&D by
analyzing whether R&D relocation would lead to welfare gains.
Proposition 6 Suppose γ (1 + ε) > 1. Further, suppose the equilibrium is
(N ; (I, A)), thus involving FDI and relocation by firm 2. Then, welfare in
country 2, defined as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, net
of fixed costs and relocation costs, is higher than it would be if no firm invested
in FDI. In country 1 the consumer surplus increases, whereas the eﬀect on
producer surplus is ambiguous.
Proof. For research relocation to be an equilibrium, profits for firm 2
must be higher than in the reference case that no firm invests. Thus, a
suﬃcient condition for welfare to increase is that consumer surplus does. As
country 2 is served by a monopoly no matter whether relocation takes place
or not, the consumer surplus will increase if and only if the costs are lower
with relocation than without. This will be true whenever the cost reduction
13See Grossman and Helpman 1991, Neven and Siotis 1993, Caves 1996, Sanna-
Randaccio 1996, Markusen and Venables 1997 and Graham and Krugman 1989 for an
assessment of the arguments.
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from external spillovers dominates over the cost increase from having to rely
on internal communication, that is, whenever γ (1 + ε) > 1.
The role of the assumption that γ (1 + ε) > 1 here is to make sure that
market access in country 1 in itself does not suﬃce to induce firm 2 to move to
country 1. Without this assumption, home-country consumer surplus might
decline as a result of research relocation.
7 The Impact of Market Size
The empirical literature suggests that oﬀshoring locations are more likely to
emerge in larger markets. In the following, we give theoretical support for
this statement, albeit with a qualification. We show that, under certain rea-
sonable parameter constellations, the larger country is more likely to emerge
as the oﬀshoring location, but there are also conceivable situations where the
smaller market is the oﬀshoring host.
To understand this, we first refine our notation, and denote the monopoly
profit of firm k in country s as ΠMks (δks) and the duopoly profit if the firm
faces firm j 6= k as ΠDks (δks, δjs). Note again that in the monopoly case
k = s. We assume that country s = 1 is the larger market, which is captured
as follows.
Assumption 2 (i) ΠM11 (δ11) > ΠM22 (δ22) if δ11 = δ12 > 0.
(ii) ΠDk1 (δk1, δj1) > Π
D
k2 (δk2, δj2) for all k ∈ {1, 2} , j 6= k if (δk1, δj1) =
(δk2, δj2).
(iii) ∂Π
M
11
∂δ11
(δ11) >
∂ΠM22
∂δ22
(δ22) if δ11 = δ22 > 0.
The role of parts (i) and (ii) is obvious: For arbitrary cost constellations,
both monopoly and duopoly profits are higher in country 1 than in country
2. Part (iii) is a similar assumption on the marginal eﬀects of cost reductions,
saying that the value of a cost reduction is greater in the larger country.
We now ask whether Assumption 2 is suﬃcient to guarantee that an
asymmetric FDI Equilibrium is more likely to occur in Country 1 than in
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Country 2. We confine ourselves to the simple case of the LRC-regime; with
R = 0. Denote the initial location of firm k (j) as s (s0). Applying the argu-
ments of Proposition 3, the conditions for an Asymmetric FDI Equilibrium
in Country s0 are
ΠDjs (γ (1 + ε)) ≤ F (17)
F ≤ ΠDks0 (1 + ε) +ΠMks (γ (1 + ε))−ΠMks (1) (18)
Condition (17) is the no-deviation condition for the non-investor that is based
in country s0; inequality (18) is the corresponding condition for the investor
that is based in country s.
Clearly, (17) is easier to satisfy if the large country 1 is the oﬀshoring
host s0: For the non-investor, deviating from an asymmetric FDI equilibrium
in a large country by investing in the small country is less attractive than
deviating from an asymmetric FDI equilibrium in a small country by invest-
ing in the large country. A similar eﬀect is present in (18), the no-deviation
constraint for the investor. ΠDks0 (1 + ε) is greater in the large country s
0 = 1
which, other things being equal, makes FDI in the large country more attrac-
tive. However, assuming that internal and external spillovers are suﬃciently
large that γ (1 + ε) > 1, a counter-eﬀect emerges. ΠMks (γ (1 + ε))−ΠMks (1) is
higher if s is the large country. Thus, there is a reason why, in principle, an
asymmetric equilibrium with research relocation might emerge in the small
country, but not in the large country: The spillover benefits to the monopoly
location are greater when this monopoly location is larger.
In spite of this possibility, for the Cournot example, the research center
is indeed likely to emerge in the large country. To see this, suppose that the
size of a market is given by the value of the parameter αl; then the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 7 In the Cournot example, suppose that γ (1 + ε) > 1. Then, if
the parameters are such that a research center in the small country 2 emerges,
there must also be an equilibrium with a research center in the large country
1.
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The proof is straightforward. By the above arguments, the statement is
true if
ΠD21 (1 + ε)+Π
M
22 (γ (1 + ε))−ΠM22 (1) ≥ ΠD12 (1 + ε)+ΠM11 (γ (1 + ε))−ΠM11 (1) ,
which, using γ (1 + ε) > 1, holds if
ΠD21 (1 + ε) +Π
M
11 (1)−ΠM11 (γ (1 + ε)) ≥ 0.
In the Cournot case, this is equivalent to
2
9
α2 +∆
µ
1
2
γ +
2
9
ε+
1
2
γε− 5
18
¶
≥ 0. (19)
This condition clearly is implied by γ (1 + ε) > 1.
8 Related Literature
In this section, we discuss the relation between our paper and existing liter-
ature. To repeat, the key features of our analysis are as follows.
1. Both the location of production and the location of R&D are endoge-
nous.
2. There are two segregated countries.
3. There are external locational spillovers and internal spillovers.
4. R&D levels are exogenous.
5. Local product-market competition is treated in reduced form, with the
Cournot case used for purposes of illustration.
Our own paper (Gersbach and Schmutzler 1999) also treats production
and R&D locations as jointly endogenous. Also, the spillover technology we
use in the present paper, with both intrafirm and interfirm spillovers goes
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back to this earlier contribution. However, the original paper addresses very
diﬀerent questions. In a setting where local competition is of an intense type
(à la Bertrand), we ask under which circumstances multi-plant firms are
nevertheless prepared to produce in some joint location so as to benefit from
technology sourcing to increase profits in other locations. By the very nature
of this exercise, the paper requires at least three locations, which makes it
much more complex than the present paper.
By far the most closely related contribution is Belderbos, Lykogianni and
Veugelers (2005), henceforth BLV.14 These authors also investigate the deter-
minants of R&D locations of multinational firms, asking how these choices de-
pend on various parameters, including the spillover parameters we consider.
There are several similarities to our paper. BLV also consider duopolists
operating in segmented markets. Both external and internal spillovers are
allowed; like in our present paper, the spillover technology builds from Gers-
bach and Schmutzler (1999). Also, the total R&D level is fixed, the only
issue being R&D location.
There are several diﬀerences, however. Most importantly, BLV concen-
trate exclusively on choices of R&D locations, assuming that both firms op-
erate in both markets. Also, the role of the relative product market size
in the two countries for these locational decisions is not analyzed. Finally,
BLV do not treat welfare issues. However, BLV are more general in other
dimensions. For instance, firms are not restricted to a single R&D loca-
tion. Rather, they can spread their budget arbitrarily over the two locations.
Moreover, BLV allow for asymmetries between firms, so that diﬀerent ef-
fects of parameter changes on the locational choices of technology leaders
and laggards, respectively, can be considered. In fact, most of their results
concern these diﬀerential eﬀects, which makes the comparison between the
two papers diﬃcult. Most closely related to our analysis, higher external and
internal spillovers induce laggards to move more R&D abroad and firms with
14Lykogianni (2006) contains related material. In addition, the author addresses further
issues such as diﬀerences in decisions concerning applied and basic research.
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a strong lead to invest less R&D abroad.
Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) and Norbäck (2001) also analyze the
relation between FDI and R&D decisions. However, both papers consider
the extent of R&D rather than the location as an endogenous variable. Like
our paper, Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) use a two-country two-firm set-
up, with each firm initially located in one country. Products are tradeable,
so that, in a first stage of the game, firms can decide whether they want to
export or engage in FDI. In addition, they can refrain from serving the foreign
market altogether. Before product market competition takes place, firms
decide on the level of cost-reducing R&D. R&D locations are not discussed.
Whatever the level of cost reduction from R&D or external spillovers, it has
the same eﬀects on both locations. The authors first analyze how locational
decisions aﬀect investments, then they consider how location choices depend
on parameters such as plant fixed costs, R&D productivity and spillovers.
Most closely related to our analysis is the result that higher spillovers tend
to induce a move from FDI to exports.15 Norbäck (2001) only considers one
firm, asking whether this firm wants to serve the world market by exporting
or by FDI. The firm also chooses its R&D level. External spillovers obviously
play no role in the analysis, but the author does consider the eﬀects of higher
technology transfer costs, corresponding roughly to worse internal spillovers
on the choice between FDI and exporting.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a model of multinational activity that diﬀers from
existing work in several respects. Most importantly, we provide the only con-
tribution where FDI and R&D oﬀshoring are both endogenous decisions. We
emphasized the role of informational exchange between and within multina-
tionals. Enlargement of markets tends to induce research relocation. More
15To repeat, however, the external spillover parameter used by Petit and Sanna-
Randaccio (2000) diﬀers from ours in that spillovers in their analysis are non-localized.
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importantly, in the setting of the model, if equilibrium behavior gives rise
to R&D relocation, it results in higher domestic welfare under fairly general
conditions.
Our paper sheds light on the popular argument that FDI could lead to a
relocation of R&D activities away from the home countries of the investing
firms and that this hurts domestic welfare.16 Our analysis suggests that, in
many circumstances, this will only happen if the reverse knowledge flows are
suﬃciently strong to increase welfare in both countries.
A fruitful extension of our approach would be to merge our analysis with
the one of BLV, allowing, like the present paper, for endogenous choices of
production locations, but adding the interesting features of BLV that include
more general choices of R&D locations as well as a leader-laggard structure.
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